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2020-11

Lounela , A 2020 , ' Contested values and climate change mitigation in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia ' , Social Anthropology , vol. 28 , no. 4 , pp. 862-880 . https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8676.12790

http://hdl.handle.net/10138/327250
https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8676.12790

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Abstract

Climate change mitigation pilot projects (REDD+ – Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) affect and interact with the local population in Central Kalimantan and many other parts of Indonesia. Rather than being politically and economically neutral activities, climate change mitigation projects tend to objectify the value of carbon, land and labour, contributing to a process of commodification of nature and social relations. In this specific case study, a set of values – equality and autonomy – central to the Ngaju people, the indigenous population in Central Kalimantan, become contested in the course of the climate change mitigation project. These central values are produced in everyday activities that include mobility and the productive base – subsistence and market-based production – among the Ngaju people. On the other hand, the climate change mitigation project-related environmental practices and actions produce values that point to individual (material) benefit and stratification of the society. The aim of the paper is to draw attention to and create understanding of value production and related tensions in the efforts to 'fix' environmental degradation problems through the climate change mitigation pilot project in Central Kalimantan.

Key words values, agency, politics, climate change mitigation, Indonesia

Introduction

This paper explores value orientations as they became contested and produced during a dispute over a climate change mitigation project in Central Kalimantan in 2012–13. In 2007, the Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership (KFCP), a REDD+ climate change mitigation pilot project (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation)[1] designed to rehabilitate the peatlands in the area and thus reduce carbon emissions, was granted $100 million by the Australian Government to reforest 70,000 hectares of peat lands, re-flood 200,000 hectares of peat swamp landscape drained by the

[1] REDD+ is a UN-initiated programme aiming to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation through forest conservation (http://www.un-redd.org/how-we-work Accessed 19 April 2017). For more detailed research on REDD+, see Angelsen and McNeill (2012) and Angelsen *et al.* (2012). For more on REDD+ in Indonesia, see Resosudarmo et al. (2014) and Howell (2013, 2014).

Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale (2020) **28**, 4 862 –880. © 2020 The Authors. Social Anthropology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Social Anthropologists.
doi:10.1111/1469-8676.12790

so-called Mega Rice Project (MRP),[2] and then plant 100 million trees in Kapuas, Central Kalimantan (Olbrei and Howes 2012). This REDD+ project wished to include local communities as participants in the reforestation activities in response to monetary payments on those activities. It utilised governance mechanisms that served to organise people in order to channel funding to the villagers and 'socialise' knowledge on climate change and its mitigation as well as the rules and principles of project work. During the ensuing years the project aims were reduced and, due to conflicts in several villages and political processes in Australia, the project was ultimately abandoned. In July 2013, because of disagreements between the villagers and the KFCP, the village of Mantangai Hulu became the first to withdraw from the project, and in 2014 the whole project was closed. The villagers who resisted the climate change mitigation project claimed that the payment they received from their reforestation work was not commensurate with the amount of energy put into the work, and that the distribution of money and decision-making power between the KFCP and people were not equal. These claims and the failure of the project prompt questions about how and why money and work are valued by the climate change agents and targeted populations, and who may define the worth of practices or what is valuable in the efforts to mitigate climate change in Indonesia.

Analytically, the paper demonstrates that the action value theory proposed by David Graeber (2001) offers a theoretical means to analyse the value conflict that emerged in the course of implementing the climate change mitigation scheme in Central Kalimantan. Climate change schemes have seldom been analysed in terms of anthropological value theories, although some anthropologists have discussed the circulation of value in the form of carbon from the Action-Network Theory perspective, looking at values of carbon in different (economy and nature) spheres, and how commodification of carbon implicates non-action (Dalsgaard 2013) or, in the case of Indonesia, in terms of the culture–nature division (Howell 2013). However, the action value theory adopted here stresses the importance of politics and power in creating (commodity) value out of the environment (planting trees as a means of carbon storage) in relation to everyday environmental practices. Thus, I adopt a view that climate change mitigation involves actions that are always compared to other actions within a larger imagined 'totality', and that the production of values involves both the making of material things and social relations. Thus, what is valuable is also a reflection of what is considered good or valuable by other people, causing people to take certain actions in that imaginary totality (Graeber 2001, 2013; Munn 1977). More specifically, I ask how and why socially recognised important values, such as equality and autonomy, conflicted with the values imposed through the climate change project in Central Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo.

The concept of value has attained a prominent role in anthropology of late (e.g. Robbins and Sommerschuh 2016). In his influential book on value, anthropologist David Graeber (2001) observes that there are three distinct theoretical concepts of value, i.e. sociological, economic and linguistic, each being associated with different theoretical traditions, but all creating abstract models of value. Aspiring to integrate these different traditions, Graeber suggests that it is possible to outline a general theory of value

[2] The Mega Rice Project (MRP) had left the landscape severely damaged (see McCarthy 2001): in 1995, President Suharto inaugurated the MRP with the goal of converting 1.4 million hectares of mainly swamp forest into rice fields in Central Kalimantan. During the course of the MRP, a network of canals was dug over an area of 4,000 square kilometres of peat land stretching between the Kapuas and Barito Rivers.

that looks at social systems as structures of creative action and value. Graeber's action value theory is indebted to Nancy Munn (1977, 1986), who in his view was the first anthropologist to develop a coherent action value theory. She understood practice as a symbolic process and acts as culturally meaningful forms or components of practice (1986: 3–7). An act is defined by Munn as 'the operation of an agent (or agents) that has potential for yielding certain outcomes' (1986: 8). For instance, the act of giving food carries with it the culturally specific capacity to produce an outcome of return hospitality and later acquire status through Gava kula shell exchange. Munn explains that the value of a certain type of act emerges from the spectrum of its possible outcomes and capacities and that it always implies a hierarchising process (1986: 18). In these respects, both Graeber's and Munn's approaches show a certain affinity with the value theory of Louis Dumont (1980), especially as it has been adapted by Joel Robbins (2013).

Central to Dumont's view is that something receives value through comparison with other values, which are always hierarchically organised, often in relation to a dominant 'supervalue' in society. Another important aspect of his theory is the notion of the reversibility of values, which points to the fundamentally dynamic nature of the structure of values (see Robbins 2013). Graeber seems to appreciate Dumont's idea of a value structure, especially when it comes to his concepts of pattern of actions and totality.

In Graeber's theory, actions are a source of value because actions can be compared within a larger totality of potential other actions. This leads to an additional important point in his value theory. His contribution to the theory of values is not just that he shows how values emerge as representations of investment of energy through socio-materially embedded actions, but also in how he considers a comparison between different potential actions as integral to the process in which actions produce values. I suggest that Graeber's greatest contribution to the theorisation of value is that he considers agents' actions as simultaneously culturally construed through this process yet socio-materially embedded. That is, value production is at once social, ideational and material, as values emerge as representations of the importance of actions. The action theory of values provides analytical tools for understanding Ngaju environmental activities as actions that produce socio-material relations and, thus, values. They do this by being articulated via either subsistence or monetary-based livelihoods and thereby via different forms of transfer, such as sharing, reciprocal exchange and/or the commodity economy.

This paper also extends this value theory discussion to Borneo studies, to a long-standing debate on stratified versus egalitarian societies (Alexander 1992; Armstrong 1992; Helliwell 1994, 1995; King 1993; Rousseau 2001; Sather 2006). As a result of this debate, equality and hierarchy are two values that have featured prominently in Borneo. Jerome Rousseau defines hereditary stratification in small-scale (so-called middle-range) societies as a 'conceptual set which classifies all members of a society into a limited number of ranked categories' (2001: 117). He argues that this condition cannot be deduced from the relations of production. Instead, he claims that 'the distinguishing factor is mobility. Mobile groups, where the local community itself is an ever-changing entity, lack stratification. Societies in which local groupings maintain their identity over a long period have stratification' (2001: 121). Rousseau argues that the variation in stratification is linked to physical mobility and demographic conditions as much as to economic and ecological conditions.

Christine Helliwell (1995) argues that western anthropologists have tended to conflate autonomy and equality in their studies of Borneo societies, which have often been classified as either egalitarian (with much personal autonomy and achieved statuses) or

stratified (with ranking and ascribed statuses). She shows that egalitarianism among the Gerai people implies both autonomy (to achieve social status and freedom from community constraints), but also ranking realised in accordance with the local *adat* (customary law or tradition). The relative autonomy of groups or even individuals does not mean that there are no achieved or ascribed statuses within or between groups. For instance, Gerai sociality includes ranks and hierarchy as well as autonomy and equality of opportunity (Helliwell 1995). Recent work done in Borneo studies makes an important and recurrent point that conditions of equality may exist in hierarchical societies, and vice versa (e.g. Sather 2006: 75). This paper engages in this discussion by looking at such values as equality, hierarchy and autonomy in connection with the idea that action and agency importantly produce values. The Ngaju are periodically mobile and spend long periods of time in their fields cultivating rice or on fishing and hunting trips. However, they also cultivate rubber and tap latex, which they sell to the markets, and engage in gold mining or timber logging. They value autonomy and flexibility highly. Autonomy is a complex issue among the Ngaju: it reflects an egalitarian orientation enabled by mobility, which involves freedom from community constraints, but it also enables inequality resulting from cash income obtained through various means (timber logging, corruption by the village head, palm oil, etc.).

I suggest understanding mobility, shifting rice cultivation, rubber tapping, the gathering of forest products and hunting as practices that produce values among the Ngaju, which again inform the clash that occurred over the climate change mitigation scheme implemented in the area in 2012–13. Thus, I will explore the dominant values among the Ngaju and how they are produced in the course of their environmental practices to then show how these values inform the conflict that emerged between the Ngaju and the company that conducted the climate change mitigation project.

The location: the frontier context in Central Kalimantan

The Ngaju are horticulturalists and shifting cultivators living in southern central Borneo along the Kahayan, Kapuas, Katingan, Ruangan and Mentaya Rivers. Ngaju means 'upriver' people, and it is an exonym for various localised groups who self-identify as river-basin groups (Schiller 1997: 186). For example, in Mantangai Hulu, the location for this ethnographic research project, people call themselves Dayak Kapuas after the river along which they live. Many of the Mantangai Hulu Ngaju hold animistic Kaharingan beliefs and practise associated rituals, even though many nominally claim to profess Christianity or Islam. The Ngaju landscape is composed of materialities such as swamp forests and rivers, but also humans, spirits, ancestors and animals.[3]

In recent decades, dramatic environmental degradation and social transformations have taken place: deforestation and oil palm expansion rates are high in Central Kalimantan, and more than 4.7 million hectares of forest are now in a severely degraded and ecologically critical condition because of timber logging, land conversion and fires, including also the MRP project that devastated more than one million hectares of swamp

[3] A local myth tells of a founding ancestor who lives in the water (underworld) and takes the form of a crocodile (*jata*) when it appears to humans. See similar stories about ancestors in Borneo in Béquet (2012) and Couderc and Sillander (2012). For the Ngaju, see Schärer (1963).

forests (Lounela 2015; McCarthy 2001; Mulyani and Jepson 2015: 81). Meanwhile, legislation governing territorial rights and nature management is constantly changing, poorly implemented and often contradictory. Central Kalimantan is thus a 'frontier' which, as Anna Tsing has noted, is an area not yet comprehensively mapped and regulated; it is in a state of flux, it moves, it disappears and it emerges again (2005: 28–9). In national discourse and related policies, Central Kalimantan is a landscape of frontier values because of the speed with which capitalism has converted nature into natural resources and has aimed to fix nature by commodifying it (Castree 2008).

Approximately 87% of Central Kalimantan is state forest land, including three million hectares of peat land that is considered valuable for carbon storage by global climate change experts (Dalsgaard 2013; Mahanty et al. 2012), thus opening large areas to climate change schemes. Because of the large amount of state-controlled forest, it has been possible for the state to extensively distribute land use permits and concessions to different corporations or agents, while government policies have encouraged business and investments by privately owned companies and agribusiness. According to some estimates, 78% of the province, or about 13 million hectares, has been licensed to concessions and plantations[4] (for more on oil palm expansion, see Gnych and Wells 2014; Anderson et al. 2016). Due to the competition over land and resources, opportunities for expansion are shrinking and what spaces there are have become arenas of debate and conflict involving many indigenous groups, including the Ngaju.

Values, mobility and the horticulturalists and shifting cultivators along the Kapuas River

This section explores physical mobility and agricultural practices as well as cash-oriented economic practices among the Ngaju. Mobility, which contributes to their autonomy and egalitarian orientation, is a defining marker of the Ngaju in Mantangai Hulu in social terms; their political and social integration as a permanently settled group has been relatively recent. Even today, people may move to huts during the fishing season, during the rice harvest or at other times for other reasons. For instance, one man told me that he had no work at the settlement and therefore he wished to stay at his field site and take care of it (field notes, 9 April 2013). This kind of mobility does not encourage hierarchical relations and strong chieftainship, since forming stable hierarchical structures is difficult when people may opt to live in another location for flexible periods of time. The most important social relations are formed with those who may move or settle together either in the village or in a forest settlement.

> Formerly, in the days of our parents, there were only a couple of houses. … There were two or three people and in the middle some [houses]; here and there were at most 2–3 houses in a place now called Mantangai Hilir [the name of the settlement before it became Mantangai Hulu village, and now the name of a nearby village]. (Customary head of village, conversation with author, 8 April 2013)

[4] See http://www.redd-monitor.org/2013/01/09/guest-post-central-kalimantans-oil-palm-catastrophe-in-pictures/ (Accessed 19 April 2017).

The customary head's narrative describes how the Mantangai settlement consisted of only a couple of houses when it was still a *padukuh* (forest settlement), but later on people moved or married and settled in the village, and it has grown in size, especially since the 1970s.[5] The Ngaju Dayak in Mantangai Hulu have always practised a subsistence economy, which includes collecting forest products, hunting and fishing, and slash and burn rice cultivation. They used to move about in the swamp forests and along the rivers in small groups or as couples, possibly with children, and they cultivated rice and fruit trees, building huts as they went, and sometimes returning to the riverside settlements. After some time, they would move to another forest location because the soil had become too infertile to cultivate rice or because nearby groups practised headhunting and they no longer felt safe.

The Mantangai Ngaju landscape consists of places that gain meaning through human mobility and everyday environmental and agricultural practices. The *kaleka* are abandoned sites close to the settlement dotted with fruit or rubber trees that mark long-term rights over them (see also Peluso 1996). As the customary head explained,

> Our ancestors used to move (*pindah*), because it was not safe to stay; there were other groups and head cutting. *Kaleka* was the place where one had lived … Now it is different; earlier it was like that, now it is a place for cultivating rice … *Kaleka* means close to a human settlement (*penghunian*). (Customary head of village, 8 April 2013)

Those who have cultivated the *kaleka* have the right to return whenever they choose, although other people can come and take produce if in need. People can spend months or just a couple of days in the *kalekas* or similar locations and then return to the settlement with fish, hunted meat or gathered plants, which they consume at home, distribute to the family or sell. A second category of land use is *bahu*, which is cultivated land that is left to return to forest after one to two years of cultivation. Finally, further from the settlement there are forest areas called *pukung pahewan*: '*Pukung* because there is an island of large trees that is inhabited by spirits, thus it is the area of *pahewan*; if one fells trees or destroys it, one may contract fever or fall ill; *pahewan*, those vicious people (*orang ganas*),[6] may take human life; one can just die, they can kill', the customary head explained.

Different environmental practices and related reciprocal relations contribute to Ngaju value production (on similar reciprocal relations and moral economy among the Kantu in West Kalimantan, see Dove and Kammen 1995). Reciprocity is embedded in exchange relations between the Ngaju and spirits such as *pahewan*. In principle, when people clear the land (*kaleka* or *bahu*) or fell large trees, they should ask permission from the spirits (*roh* or *orang gaib*) and request not to be disturbed in their activities; the land and every tree and specific place has its own spirit, I was told by a person regarded as a spiritual and healing specialist (*pawang*). One elderly man also explained that people who hunt or clear a field should follow the requirements of making an offering, such as a chicken, an egg or cigarettes, saying 'This is our request, please fulfil it so that I may be successful', and putting an *ancak* (bamboo tray) in the specific place

[5] The Village Law was inaugurated in 1979 and it reorganised the village settlements into a hierarchical structure consisting of the village head and staff and the villagers.

[6] *Orang ganas* translates as 'vicious people', but here it means spirits.

as symbolic proof that the request has been made. Local religious experts may also communicate with the spirits and ask them what they want in return for not disturbing people when they start to work a plot, fell trees or cultivate rice. 'If we enter someone's space, we ask permission first, we knock on the door; it is the same with spirits', the village's head of the Kaharingan congregation told me (field notes, 8 April 2013). The forest is a place where people need to be especially careful, since there are both good and bad spirits (as with people). This exchange system is relatively straightforward; spirits control the land, the forest and nature itself, and they allow access to what they consider their realm. Spirits expect to receive offerings in different forms when they provide access and user rights to humans. These exchange relations with spirits and other natural elements constitute the landscape, which is comprised of *kaleka*, *bahu*, *pukung pahewan* and human settlements.

In the case of the Ngaju in Mantangai Hulu, exchange relations with the spirits of the land and forest were generally benevolent and flexible; people could easily open up large tracts of land, mark them with fruit or other trees, and collect plants and hunt animals. The Ngaju value flexibility in terms of ownership (of land, trees, etc.), and this also applies to their spirits, which have given people relatively easy access to the land. Here, mobility, non-hierarchical society and the value of equality connect with the notion of reciprocity between the (nature) spirits and people.

For a long time, the Ngaju people have participated in the market economy through, among other things, rubber tapping and the rattan trade, and in recent decades through gold mining and timber logging. The income received by the villagers varied greatly depending on their access to or ownership of land and the intensity and type of work they did. Most of the villagers worked in rubber gardens: from one hectare of rubber garden (consisting of approximately 300–500 trees), one could gain about 50,000 Indonesian rupiah (IDR) for roughly half a day's work, with the freedom to do it whenever s/he wanted (US$1 is equivalent to about 9,800 IDR in 2012). Most people told me that they needed a rubber garden at least two hectares in size if they wanted to tap latex every day. One man who owned more than two hectares told me that he earned 250,000 IDR a day, with the advantage that he was also able to leave some of the trees to rest. Those whose access to land was limited cleared grass in other people's rubber gardens or dry rice fields, which would bring one person an income of 25,000–50,000 IDR a day, with lunch included, depending on the working hours. Rice planting had been a collective effort; (mainly) women circulated from one rice field (*ladang*) to another, each earning approximately 25,000 IDR per day. This was a reciprocal system in the sense that women took turns working in each other's rice fields. However, they could also do this collectively without payment, i.e. labour 'voluntarily' (*handep*). There were also various harvest-sharing systems. During the dry season, fish were plentiful and many fished for their household consumption. If they sold fish in the village, they could earn 30,000–40,000 IDR/kg, depending on the fish species. Timber logging, a risky business, which many claimed had increased during the KFCP period, could pay 2.5 million IDR for a couple of weeks' work. Money from illegal logging was often quickly spent. Gold mining could bring in a similar amount of money, but many men who travelled far for gold mining returned home without much money. Women in particular collected rattan from the forest, dried it and wove rattan mats and other items, which they sold – it was irregular income and the prices varied greatly according to the item and size. Some people collected and sold Eaglewood (locally *gaharu*) bark. These activities also constituted socially productive

work (except, perhaps, illegal logging and gold mining), and thus the price paid varied depending on the social commitments related to them. For instance, collective rice cultivation, harvesting and sharing differed from the KFCP's REDD+-related activities wherein individual work and its results would be monetarily compensated if evaluated by the KFCP as successful. While the market-based approach gave rise to individual gain and inequality (between KFCP authorities and villagers, but also between the villagers), as a primary value it contrasted heavily with sharing and related values of equality and relationality

The rubber economy is extremely vulnerable to price fluctuations as well as to forest fires. When prices are very low, people might shift to gold mining or timber logging. In the rubber market economy, Ngaju participation has been based on the principle of maximum return for minimum input – an attitude reminiscent of Malinowski's description of the Trobriand work ethic (1999 [1922]). Acquiring a weekly income sufficient for a family's livelihood may demand only three to four half-days of rubber gardening – or even less, if people have obtained enough rice through shifting cultivation – in addition to hunting, fishing and gathering. In Dove's (2012) ethnographic case study of the Kantu, he found that engaging in the rubber economy is an individualistic, cash-oriented activity that 'kills the land', taking it out of the agricultural production cycle in the sense that it is no longer possible to cultivate rice there any longer, although one can pick, for instance, mushrooms or rattan from the rubber gardens. Thus, rubber tapping, by removing land from the production cycle, may in the long run hinder subsistence rice cultivation and the social relations it produces. Among the Ngaju, arguably, it also illustrates the importance of autonomy, which the Ngaju value highly; through their practices, they control their own labour and time and may choose to switch from one practice to another whenever they so desire. However, the rubber economy may remove the land from rice cultivation and thus curtail socially productive practices, such as rice cultivation.

The Ngaju in Mantangai have successfully combined rubber tapping with a subsistence economy for a long time. Rice cultivation is a collective process since women and men plant and harvest rice in groups and rotate through different fields. In terms of the production of values, it points towards those of equality, as the harvest has always been somehow shared and the people are used to working in the fields in groups. Thus, the moral economy of the productive base gives rise to two different types of value orientations: the rubber economy gives rise to autonomy and also individualism, while rice cultivation gives rise to sharing and equality (see Dove 2012; Harrington 2015; Lounela 2017). In short, mobility and the social-environmental relations produced through exchange and agricultural production are the media of value production, generating specific central values such as equality and autonomy.

Contesting values through monetary-based nature management

This section explores the disputes and tensions that emerged during the course of implementing the KFCP's project in the village and nearby areas. Mantangai Hulu is one of seven villages and seven sub-villages that are part of the KFCP's Australian-funded REDD+ project in the Kapuas district. The district of Kapuas has been the site of enormous transformations of the landscape, largely as a result of the failed MRP

(for more on MRP, see, for example, McCarthy 2001; Lounela 2015). Large forest fires have taken place periodically ever since (Galudra et al. 2011: 436; Putra et al. 2008: 334).

Soon after the MRP was abandoned, conservation projects were launched with the aim of 'fixing' the situation by preventing forest fires, planting trees and blocking the canals that cut across the peat land. However, after almost ten years of work by conservation organisations around the villages, forest fires and timber cutting were still major problems and new contradictions had emerged (Mulyani and Jepson 2015: 85; for discussion of a similar situation in West Kalimantan, see Eilenberg 2015: 58).

The KFCP wanted to take a 'new' approach, and it has claimed that it seeks to involve local people in the project by paying them to reforest destroyed peat land in the ex-MRP area; thus, the villagers would benefit economically and socially from the project. For this to take place, a governance system was needed. The KFCP decided to utilise the former World Bank assistance system in the village, a system known as PNPM (National Program for Community Empowerment).[7] Mantangai Hulu became a 'model village', in which, it was hoped, the introduction of techniques of good governance, education and increased cash flow would transform people's behaviour and their relationship with nature (*perubahan perilaku*) (discussion with KFCP staff, 1 June 2012). It operated through village-based institutions, such as an Activity Management Team (TPK – *Tim Pengelola Kegiatan*) and a Controller Team (TP – *Tim Pengawas*), the village head and various functionaries, along with several neighbourhood-based organisations that manage reforesting activities, canal blocking and livelihood issues. To operate the pilot project, the KFCP offered five Work Packages: Basic, Nursery, Field Planting and Nursery, *tatas* and the Livelihood and Development Package Phase 1.[8]

In May 2013, I walked with the customary head of Mantangai Hulu to the KFCP office located in the sub-district of Mantangai. There, we met with some staff who had been working for different environmental organisations (CARE Indonesia, BOS – Borneo Orangutan Survival) and who worked for the KFCP.[9] During our discussions, one of them told me that the KFCP only channelled technical teams (*tim teknis*), money and other support to the village. The staff told me that their work was to train the villagers, who would then implement the activities of reforestation, blocking and vegetation.[10] It turned out that even though many of the KFCP staff were of Dayak origin, they assumed the role of specialists and new knowledge bearers – one of them used the word *penyuruh*, which can be translated as 'the one who gives the orders'. In

[7] PNPM is a World Bank programme to reduce poverty in villages through various projects.

[8] See http://www.iafcp.or.id/uploads/20121204161209.Mantangai_Hulu_Eng.pdf (Village agreement between KFCP and Mantangai Hulu village) (Accessed 15 April 2014).

[9] The KFCP design document (2009) details tasks under the responsibility of the KFCP (comprised of several partners). CARE staff should do socialisations, baseline surveys, alternative livelihoods and socio-economic monitoring; Wetland staff should focus on dam designs, construction work and training villagers to do the dam construction themselves, and monitoring peatland hydrology; BOS should focus on reforestation, small canal blocking and organising villagers to monitor illegal logging and fires; KFCP task groups should prepare the Terms of Reference and give advice at different levels.

[10] Since KFCP staff were not very active in Mentangai Hulu when I was there (due to a conflict that emerged just before I arrived in the village), information on their activities in this paper draws from interviews and discussions with KFCP staff and villagers as well as the KFCP design paper.

their view, the villagers 'owned the activities', meaning that they had relative freedom to do the work, although they had to follow the KFCP criteria and adopt the knowledge disseminated by the KFCP. However, when I later discussed this idea with some of the villagers, they told that they wondered how the KFCP staff could use speedboats, stay in hotels and bath with bottled water. Their experience was that previous environmental projects (with some of the people that now worked for the KFCP) had no effect on the village and did not bring them any benefits. In my view, the villagers' arguments reveal their dislike of hierarchical relations and disparities in wealth, in addition to frustration.[11]

Soon after the KFCP began drafting the village agreement in the village in 2009, contradictions and disputes began to emerge. In 2012, conflict emerged between the village head and a group of villagers who demonstrated against him, claiming that he had been corrupted by the desire for money from the KFCP programme and had misused his position as the village head. In 2013, the village head explained that the villagers were led by a provocateur (Mursian[12]) who had been dismissed after the inauguration of a new regulation that village secretaries have to be state officials (PNS). Mursian, a middle-aged Ngaju man, was a leading figure in the village, a former village secretary, but also a 'peasant activist' who had wide connections with the local and national NGOs concerned with extra-local extractive businesses and large-scale conservation agencies. However, Mursian was clearly not acting alone with his resistance and claims that village head was corrupt.[13] Those resisting the KFCP did so for two principal reasons: a loss of autonomy in the sense of being told how things ought to be done 'right' (changing behaviours and following the mechanisms for reforestation activities) and low payment for the work they did for the project.

Investing energy, with low payment in return: producing inequality through monetary payments

The KFCP reforestation area in Mantangai Hulu was quite small, only 25 hectares initially, followed by a further 100 hectares. One had to travel to these locations by small wooden motor boat (*klotok*) via the rivers or canals. Some people considered reforestation to be very hard work. The typical Ngaju method was to uproot the suckers of desirable trees and either replant them elsewhere on the plot or discard them if the tree density was considered sufficient; the trees would grow on their own if the ground was kept clear

[11] Some researchers have argued that only some villagers were discontent with the KFCP project, which was due to misunderstandings or their vested interests (see https://www.cifor.org/redd-case-book/case-reports/indonesia/kalimantan-forests-climate-partnership-central-kalimantan-indonesia/) (Accessed 10 June 2020). However, what I try to show here is that this is far too simplistic a viewpoint and it fails to understand how external monetary-based projects may add to tensions and disputes when they intervene in environmental activities that are 'total' in Mauss's sense of the word.

[12] Pseudonym. I have changed the names of the people mentioned in this paper.

[13] In 2013, I tried to explore the land ownership registers kept in the house of the village head, and it became obvious that the village head had gained some benefits by distributing land ownership papers (*Surat keterangan tanah*) on the land around the village. However, it became difficult to prove that the village head had gained benefits as a result or had done anything else, since he reported that most of the records had accidentally burned in a fire. He also told me that the customary head had accused him of illegally taking some electricity project money, but he was innocent.

of undergrowth and new self-sown seedlings were left undisturbed. This they did not refer to as 'hard work'. Some villagers considered this work too physically demanding (under the hot sun, carrying heavy weight, etc.), but seemingly also because the working method they had to adopt was based on knowledge that they considered mistaken, and the social relations formed through work produced new social hierarchies (see below).

The KFCP reforestation method meant using the technique of reforesting burned soil with pre-grown seedlings. Villagers collected seeds from the forest areas and brought them to the settlement. After that they prepared nurseries for growing seeds into seedlings in the settlement, they planted and watered them until they were about 15–30 cm in height. In 2011–12, collecting certain kinds of seeds would provide 800 to 1,300 IDR per seed; nurturing them to 20–30-cm high seedlings would bring additional income, if it were successful; while transporting seedlings to the planting location paid 60,000 IDR per day. Some villagers who took part in the reforestation method thought it would bring additional income and that the men would no longer need to travel far from the village for gold mining, which was considered dangerous – however, that was obviously not the case: the pay was low and the work hard.[14]

The KFCP village staff (the TP and TPK) each earned from 600,000 to 900,000 IDR per month for managing the programme from the village. The TP and TPK staff seemed pleased with their monthly income. Those who claimed ownership rights to small streams (*tatas*) could earn millions of IDR as compensation for blocking them (though the owners had to share the money with other workers and pay costs). This was considered a generous amount of money, though if the *tatas* were at some distance from the village the sum sometimes did not equate with its worth to the owner, and furthermore, some were reluctant to block their streams because they would lose access to the areas around them. Most often, I was told, ownership rights to streams derived from the times of the logging period, when the villagers had widened and deepened the streams by digging out the soil to transport logs to Kapuas River.

The Ngaju who wanted to work for the KFCP hoped they could avoid much riskier illegal logging and gold mining activities and obtain a regular income. Some people imagined that they could engage in the carbon trade; one man told me that he had heard that selling carbon could bring 3 million IDR per month per person – thus, he was very fond of the KFCP (although the KFCP as a demonstration project did not yet include an effort to engage people in the carbon trade). Further, those who had restricted access to land and rubber gardens (many had lost rubber trees in forest fires) were eager to participate in such work because they could not earn enough from tapping latex to, for instance, educate their children. Some women thought that they could easily prepare the seedlings, do reforesting and thus receive some income, but it turned out that the techniques introduced by the KFCP and socialised through different pieces of training could not be adopted as easily as they had thought. One woman told me that she had failed twice at preparing the seedlings and bringing them to a particular location, with the result being that her work was not compensated by the KFCP. This was obviously problematic, even though in the eyes of TPK and the KFCP the seedlings did not fulfil their criteria. Additionally, one man said that a person could die when engaging in reforesting work under the hot sun, which is why he had quit in the middle of the job.

[14] The village head and village staff could receive much higher fees: their fees ranged from 250,000 IDR to 750,000 IDR, whereas ordinary villagers received 50,000 IDR from most of the training meetings.

The KFCP staff in Jakarta told me that it had created this result-based payment mechanism to change the Dayaks' spoiled behaviour, resulting from their involvement in timber logging prior and during the MRP, when they received high monetary rewards from those activities; now they should learn the proper way of working (scientific, knowledge-based work) with a reasonable compensation for doing a proper job (healthy, tall enough seedling, etc.). This statement reveals how the project produces moral values (and valuations) that concern the characters and position of the local population, which also is typical especially of Indonesian state projects.

A capitalist understanding of money would suggest that money is a medium of value; it enables people to compare one thing with another and evaluate the worth of both. Thus, value is a product of the difference attached to an object on the market. However, a Marxist-inspired analysis stresses money as an embodiment of value and the representation of labour: since the workers perform productive work in order to receive payment, the value that the money represents is the value of the labour itself – in this sense, money is also a symbol (see Graeber 2001: 66–7). Money is thus a medium through which people evaluate the value of their work and themselves. Here, as David Graeber points out, money measures the importance and meaning of people's creative action and capacity to act. For instance, the villagers expected that if they took part in reforestation, the outcome would be a payment that compensated for the energy put into the work.[15] The amount they were paid provided a measure with which to evaluate the worth of their work and themselves. Reforestation became an activity that placed them on a lower rung of the hierarchical ladder because their work was evaluated as being low in worth, which was also symbolised by the price paid for the products (products resulting from the reforesting activities, canal blocking, etc.), showing that commodifying environmental activities creates disputes over social and economic values.

Jason Moore (2016, 2018) has argued that the Capitalocene, or 'age of capital', is based on the appropriation of space, uncommodified nature and unpaid labour; this is in line with Harvey's (2001) and Castree's (2008) argument that capitalism constantly needs new spaces, and also that it destroys and 'fixes' the environment and landscapes it encounters as a means of survival. What is more important in the present context is that Moore stresses that people are transformed into cheap labour and nature into a cheap resource in the process of forming the Capitalocene (Moore 2018: 241). This analysis resonates with the ways in which the Ngaju articulated their resistance to the project: they were paid little while the work was very hard, their work was evaluated as not being good enough to warrant any payment at all and they had become cheap labour (*buruh*) for the KFCP, making it clear that the value that the KFCP placed on their work did not equate with how they themselves valued their actions.

Governance and values of autonomy and flexibility

As noted at the beginning of the paper, in any given society (or, as Graeber terms it, 'imaginary totality') people pursue particular forms of value (or imagined goods).

[15] Women, in particular, felt they could obtain extra income from reforestation activities. However, many were surprised by the hard work and a payment system that followed results-based principles.

However, action always takes a material form, which reflects the imagined good. Thus, value production is both imaginary and material, and it is both social and individual, since what people desire, and how they act, reflect what others in the society regard as good, meaningful and desirable. For instance, most of the people I talked with questioned the governance system that came with the KFCP's climate change mitigation scheme. Initially, many Ngaju welcomed the project because they wanted to stop forest fires from spreading in the area and obtain some material benefits at the same time. In this section, I argue that their later criticism related to their preference for the locally important values of equality and autonomy.

The KFCP formed a governance system that aimed to transform people's working practices and way of thinking through several techniques. As mentioned earlier, the governance system utilised by the KFCP was the village-based TPK and TP. The TP staff members included village state officials, principally elected by the village head, while the TPK staff were elected at the (customary) *musyawarah* meetings. The TPK controlled various activities related to reforestation work, including the tasks performed by the villagers and payments for completing the tasks, while the TP monitored the work of the TPK with respect to socialisation, procurement, acceptance of work, materials and services and finance.[16]

The activities of the Ngaju in the reforesting and canal blocking efforts were controlled and monitored first by the TPK staff. The KFCP paid the villagers fees to plant various species, which they had successfully grown into healthy seedlings. The result-based payment meant that the payment was made at different stages (*termin*) after first being evaluated by the TPK village staff: they verified the proper height and condition of the seedlings and how they had been planted. The evaluation resulted in the decision as to whether the villagers were paid at all. Many Ngaju strongly argued against such an evaluation system that targeted their performance in the reforestation activities.

In 2013, I discussed these matters with the village head. He expressed disappointment with and was against the presence of the KFCP in the village, even though he had collaborated with it earlier. During our discussion, he said he would not sign a new agreement, even if the KFCP wanted him to do so (the agreement ended at the end of June 2013). Though he had initially facilitated the project in the village, the KFCP failed to appreciate his efforts, as demonstrated by the fact that the KFCP did not give more money to the village in order to finalise the reforestation effort, even though the village head had asked them to do so (it had stopped making payments when the conflicts began). On the other hand, the TPK staff told me that the village head had requested 10 million IDR for each paper that he signed (including the payments to the villagers). The governance system that the KFCP wanted to implement through the village staff was quite vulnerable to corruption. However, if we think in terms of values and agency, the village head was trying to gain status through achievement (more wealth).

A number of inhabitants expressed deep distrust in the TPK and TP when I visited the village in 2012–13. In the end, the distrust became mutual. The following statement by a TPK staff member illustrates how difficult it was to get people to work on the project:

[16] http://www.iafcp.or.id/uploads/20121204161209.Mantangai_Hulu_Eng.pdf (Village agreement between KFCP and Mantangai Hulu village) (Accessed 15 April 2017).

> Not all the people are the same; some of them manipulate us. We let some know before they go to work that it is really heavy (*sangat berat*), that there is no sun protection and they have to be able to stand the sun. They say they want to work anyway, but after 1–2 days they say that they can't continue and they leave. Yet, the TPK is the one who they claim is in the wrong. It becomes the victim. (Field notes, 20 May 2012)

The TPK adopted the reforestation technique proposed by the KFCP and imposed it on the villagers, with the result being that they felt constrained by it. Furthermore, even if the villagers were able and willing to transfer the living seedlings to the far-away plots of deforested land, they were not sure that the seedlings would survive the conditions – people asked if it was worth it to put their energy into the work. Furthermore, they came into conflict with the TPK because the TPK was not willing to pay the fees before their work was evaluated; in the Ngaju understanding, the payment should have been made immediately.

I argue that Ngaju resistance emerged as a result of the KFCP-imposed governance system, which included subordinating the villagers to the system and also to having their acts and work valued by the KFCP. In terms of values, the KFCP intervened with their autonomy and flexibility in the sphere of work, generally understood as producing autonomy; being free of societal constraints and having the freedom to decide about one's amount of labour and space are key values; if the monetary reward is low, or if the Ngaju consider the working conditions too harsh or dislike them, the Ngaju often choose to leave the job. Many villagers described the reforesting activities as overly strenuous, low-paid and constraining.

In 2013, the KFCP stopped its activities in Mantangai Hulu. When I came to the village in 2013, the KFCP village office had been abandoned and the village head explained to me that he was very disappointed with the KFCP: Why were they so afraid of the villagers? Why did they not try to resolve the conflict? In July 2014, it was announced that the demonstration project for reducing emissions and deforestation and forest degradation conducted by the KFCP had come to an end in its current form. The Australian government withdrew funding from the project (also for political reasons in Australia), meaning that the project was discontinued.[17]

No effort was made to resolve the conflict and negotiate with the villagers, who soon realised there were other territorial projects that would probably replace the KFCP and compete over the land. In 2014, when I visited the village and the KFCP had withdrawn, an oil palm corporation had already entered the village, being encouraged by the village head. I could see oil palm trees planted on the bank of the small river that joined the Kapuas River.

Conclusions

Anthropologists have generally understood values in terms of either value monism (Dumont 1980; Robbins 2013, 2015; Robbins and Sommerschuh 2016) or value pluralism (Kluckhohn 1951; Weber 1967; Graeber 2001, 2013). Either values are realised in separate social domains, and thus, they do not give rise to conflicts, or

[17] http://www.iafcp.or.id/content/page/44/KFCP (Accessed 6 August 2013).

then a plurality of values co-exists, in which case people have to make difficult choices between conflicting values (for more on this topic, see Robbins 2013, 2015). Robbins argues that most societies have both monist and pluralist tendencies and that Dumont's understanding is in fact not monist, but instead 'leaves us in theoretical terms with a model in which pluralism and monism are both fundamental features of social life' (2013: 105). However, rather than focusing on a super value as an abstract idea that organises other values, I have stressed how values are implicated in actions (environmental practices), its qualities (time and labour) and relations of power. From this perspective, values are not ideas of separate social domains, as they are for Weber, or abstract categories (Dumont), or even a combination of both (Robbins 2013), but rather a means to measure the importance of actions through specific socio-material media in pursuit of the good (life). Resembling Dumont's idea of hierarchy, but based on Graeber (2001), I show that certain actions can be compared to other actions in terms of how much energy is put into an action and how this relates to its importance with respect to what is considered good. Moreover, I argue that the choices people make based on values are often tragic in the sense that they have long-term (and often unpredictable) implications for social and environmental relations. Thus, I have argued that value-ideas need to be analysed in connection with the material media of value production as well as the social and power relations that they are bound up with through particular actions.

Among the Ngaju, values are produced through the media of socio-material environmental practices and through spatial mobility as part of a process in which value production is both social and individual, since people's individual considerations of what is good reflect what others in society consider good and meaningful. Exemplifying this idea, Mantangai Hulu Ngaju shifting cultivation and hunting provide the media of value production that promote sharing, and thus equality, while rubber tapping facilitates autonomy but also individualism in the swamp forest landscape, which has provided a space of cosmology implicated in the media of value production.

I have shown that the mobility that still prevails and the related autonomy encourage equality in some situations, for instance when a person opts to leave a community to avoid constraints, which serve to hinder stratification or the formation of hierarchies. Similarly, in some situations the Ngaju people's participation in the market economy through monetarily rewarded activities (rubber tapping, timber logging, etc.) produces autonomy. But while the Ngaju may control their own time and labour, this participation also encourages hierarchies through the accumulation of individual wealth and status. Here, we can observe the 'reversibility of values': the reversibility of values between the levels of hierarchy is indicated when autonomy does not necessarily enable equality among the Ngaju, since in some situations it points to the freedom to achieve status through material means, as was the case with the village head. Thus, egalitarianism does not mean that there are no hierarchies, but both might be socially acceptable if they complement each other in socially recognised situations and ways.

Analysing the market-based climate change mitigation efforts exercised by the KFCP has demonstrated that its dominant values of individualism and inequality clash and conflict with the Ngaju values of autonomy and egalitarianism. Growing trees for carbon storage and as financial instruments or marketable commodities promotes economic value over other values, giving rise to conflicts over who may define the values or the worth of practices.

The KFCP's value-producing activities differed from monetary-based timber logging, rubber tapping and mining in that such activities came with a governance system, new social constraints and hierarchies, rules and strict monetary calculations per activity that were determined and ordered by an external international agent together with the village's administrative staff. The disciplinary governance system, in Foucalt's sense, brought new constraints, paid low wages to the villagers, giving rise to conflict by imposing values of hierarchy and individualism. The Ngaju resisted their loss of autonomy and flexibility, the two central local values sustained through their investment of creative energy in agricultural activities.

Furthermore, equality was a focal value in their resistance to the KFCP and its effort to turn villagers into a labour force compensated by low monetary rewards (masked by the representation that it brought economic benefits to the people). Collecting seeds and planting seedlings were understood by the villagers as hard work that was not properly compensated – the argument was that their work load was valued too low. They also compared the monetary rewards they received from their work (if they did) to those that the KFCP's staff received and to money the KFCP used for travelling by speedboat and for other purposes, and they concluded that inequality between the villagers and the KFCP dominated the exchange. The action approach developed in this paper thus also contests the old commodity/gift dichotomy in anthropology wherein the value of commodities expresses the desirability of objects (and material needs) and the value of gifts expresses the importance of human social relations (social needs) (Graeber 2001: 45; cf. Gregory 1997; Mauss 1967). Whether in the form of gifts or commodities, the most important and meaningful things are those into which people invest the most through their actions, and value is determined by time, labour and the relations of production.

Ultimately, values are also a question of politics and power, pointing to the issue of who defines important actions and values. This became manifest in the ways the KFCP imposed operating rules on the Ngaju, such as changing the fees for growing seedlings and imposing new rules for bringing them to the planting locations, or in refusing to pay the villagers because seedlings (or dams) were evaluated as being of unsatisfactory quality by KFCP-affiliated personnel. The Ngaju questioned the power of the KFCP to define the value of their labour and the quality of their work, which contrasted with their autonomy and freedom from constraints (on value politics, see Graeber 2001). The capitalistic effort to fix the environment through REDD+ failed because the disciplining governance system created hierarchies and cheap labour through forest-related practices in a forest space that provides the local Ngaju with their cosmological moral space, a space in which mobility, foraging and shifting cultivation practices produce the central values of autonomy and equality.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank my colleagues Timo Kaartinen, Markus Kröger, Jenni Mölkänen and Tuomas Tammisto – our study group – for their comments. The first version of this paper was presented at the AAA conference in November 2013. I thank Signe Howell for her valuable comments on the early draft of this paper. Pujo Semedi has supported the research project in many ways, for which I am very grateful. I also thank Isabell

Herrmans, Kenneth Sillander and Sarah Green for their comments on the later versions of the work. The research would not have been possible without the grants from Kone Foundation and Academy of Finland.

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Valeurs contestées et atténuation du changement climatique au Kalimantan central, en Indonésie

Les projets pilotes d'atténuation du changement climatique (REDD+ – Réduction des émissions dues à la déforestation et à la dégradation des forêts) impactent et interagissent avec la population locale du Kalimantan central et de nombreuses autres régions d'Indonésie. Au lieu d'être des activités politiquement et économiquement neutres, les projets d'atténuation du changement climatique ont tendance à objectiver la valeur du carbone, de la terre et du travail, alimentant ainsi un processus de marchandisation de la nature et des relations sociales. Dans la présente étude de cas, le projet d'atténuation du changement climatique remet en question un ensemble de valeurs fondamentales pour le peuple Ngaju, la population indigène du Kalimantan central : l'égalité et l'autonomie. Chez le peuple Ngaju, ces valeurs fondamentales se révèlent dans les activités quotidiennes engageant la mobilité et la base productive – la subsistance et la production en fonction du marché. Par ailleurs, les pratiques et les actions environnementales liées au projet d'atténuation du changement climatique produisent des valeurs orientées vers l'avantage individuel (matériel) et la stratification sociale. L'objectif de cet article est de mettre en évidence et d'expliquer la production de valeur et les tensions associées dans le cadre des efforts déployés pour « régler » les problèmes de dégradation environnementale, à travers le cas du projet pilote d'atténuation du changement climatique au Kalimantan central.

Mots-clés valeurs, agentivité, politique, atténuation du changement climatique, Indonésie